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ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the options for a reform of the German pension system using a model
developed at CES for the German Council of economic advisors to the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Research. It is argued that the German pay-as-you-go-system is efficient in a present value sense but will
nevertheless need the support of a funded system to avoid a financial crisis. The paper investigates the
possibility of introducing obligatory private savings at a variable rate where the time path of the savings rate
is chosen so as to stabilize the sum of this rate and the pay-as-you-go contribution rate, given the time path








I am concerned that "the feeling of human dignity, which I want even the poorest German to
have, should be kept alive, that he should not simply be an object of charity without any rights,
that he should have a peculium which belongs to him alone…  which makes it easier for him to
open many doors which otherwise would be closed, and which, if he can take his contribution out
again when he leaves, ensures him better treatment in the house to which he has been admitted."
1
These are the words Bismarck used in his speech to the Reichstag on 2nd April 1881 to justify his
social legislation. It is significant that he used the word "peculium" for the public assistance he
wanted the old and sick to receive. The peculium was the money Roman slaves were allowed to
save up and could ultimately use to buy their freedom. Obviously, Bismarck saw the old people’s
situation as an underprivileged one, similar to that of the slaves in ancient Rome, and from which
it was necessary to liberate them.
Bismarck did succeed in liberating pensioners. People in today’s society are not
stigmatized for being old and do not need to beg from their children to live a well ordered life.
However now, a hundred years later, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. The real
problem today is the enormous burden facing contributors, not the stigma facing pensioners. The
combined rate of contributions by employers and employees to the pension insurance system in
Germany is 20 %. This burden will become even heavier in future, because there will be more
and more pensioners and fewer and fewer people available to work. Even today, many people are
finding the contributions burden oppressive, and there are grounds for believing that this burden
is one of the reasons for the high wage costs in Germany and for the resulting unemployment.
The paper discusses the impending problem of financing the German pension insurance
system and the possibilities available for sensible reforms which can prevent the system breaking
                                                
1Cited according to Stein (no year).2
down under the weight of the excessive contributions and endangering Germany’s political
system. It reports on research carried out by Munich’s Center for Economic Studies (CES) for the
Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Research
2.
2. The Implications of the Demographic Developments for the Pension Insurance System
There were no special financing problems when Bismarck introduced the pension insurance
system because the number of old people affected was very small relative to the number of young
people. Figure 1 compares the German age pyramid in Bismarck’s time with that in 1995. It can
be seen that the number of old people at the top of the pyramid in Bismarck’s time was extremely
small relative to the number of young people lower down. If birth rates had been constant, the
pyramid would have looked the same in 1995 as it did in 1875. However, this is not the case.
Today’s pyramid, which is shown on the right, belies its name. It should more correctly be called
a pine tree, not a pyramid, as the younger age classes contain less people than the older ones.
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Figure 1: The German age pyramid in Bismarck’s time (1875) and today (1995)
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, Tab. 3.11, Bevölkerung 1995 nach dem Alter, p. 62, 1997;
Kaiserliches Statisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsches Reich,  Vol. 30, April, pp. 7-9, tab.4. Die
Bevölkerung am 1. Dez 1875 nach Geschlecht und 11 Altersklassen, 1878.
It is quite obvious that the pine tree structure creates problems for a pension insurance
system which operates with pay-as-you-go financing. Fewer and fewer young people must
finance more and more old people. It is also quite obvious that the greatest difficulties are yet to
come. It will become really bad when the heavy branches now at the lower levels of the pine tree
move up to the pensionable levels. This is what is going to happen in the thirties of the next
century. By then it will hardly be possible to keep the pay-as-you-go process operating in its
present form.
The pine tree got its shape because the growth rate of the German population has been
falling continuously over time. Last century this growth rate was about 1.1% and, in Europe, it4
was the third highest after Great Britain and Finland.
3  Today the growth rate is - 0.1%  in terms
of the native German population and +0.6% when immigrants are included.
4
The problem is that the Germans do not have as many children as they used to. Ten
Germans now only have on average seven children. Germany is no longer third from the top in
Europe; in the OECD it is now third from the bottom. Only Spain and Italy have still lower birth
rates than Germany does.
The falling number of children is not the only thing that creates problems for the pension
insurance system, increasing life expectancy does so, too. Medical advances are increasing
remaining life expectancy of a sixty five year old German man or woman by around 1.5 months
each year, that is, by an additional year every eight years. The gap between the number of births
and remaining life expectancy is widening all the time and this will create more and more trouble
for the pension insurance system because the number of people of pension age is rising
continuously relative to those of working age.
3. Implications for the Development of the Contribution Rate
The demographic distortion has serious effects for the contribution rates of the pension insurance
system. Currently 100 Germans in working age (between 20 and 64 years) support 25 older
people. In 2035, they will have to support between 50 and 55 older people, depending on which
population forecast is used.
5 One does not need to set up a forecasting model to see that there will
need to be either a very large increase in the contribution rate or a considerable reduction in the
pension.
                                                
3 See Mitchell (1981).
4 See Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch der BRD, various issues.
5 See Statistisches Bundesamt, Achte koordinierte Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung, Variante 2, Wiesbaden 1994;
Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe, Bevölkerungsprognose, Variante A, Bonn 1996.5
Up to 1992 Germany had a pension system in which the pensions were linked t o the
growth of gross wages. Based on this, the range of possibilities open to the politicians for 2035 is
between doubling the contribution rates for the same pensions and halving the pensions with the
same contribution rates. The politicians can choose some point within this range but they cannot
perform miracles. If they are to succeed in preventing the contribution rate from increasing from
20% today to 40 % in future, the pensioners must make sacrifices.
The Bundestag has defined a comprehensive program of sacrifices with its pension
reforms of 1992 and 1997. It  has replaced tying the pension to the gross wage with tying it to the
net wage, it has done away with early retirement, it  has abolished the pension for occupational
invalidity (due to decline in earning capacity), it has made it more difficult to get a general
disability pension, and it has decided that the pension of the so called "standard pensioner", that
is, someone who has paid contributions based on average income for 45 years, will fall from 70%
to 64% of the net wage. All these measures have helped make the problem seem less serious, but
they only make up a policy of mere deficiency management which, whether intentionally or not,
has obscured the issue of the coming crisis of the statutory pension insurance system.6
Figure 2: The development of the contribution rate with alternative population forecasts
Source: CES
Figure 2 illustrates the results of a model developed at CES, using alternative population
forecasts of the Federal Statistical Office and an Interministerial Working Group.
6 The
calculations cover the effects of the pension reductions which came into force in 1992 and 1997
and the increase in the federal grant established in 1997. The bottom forecast is based on the
estimates of the Federal Statistical Office, which in turn were based on the optimistic – from the
point of view of the pension insurance system – assumption that life expectancy of the west
Germans will remain constant after the year 2000. It was also assumed that an additional 11
million foreigners will migrate to Germany up to the year 2030. The top forecast assumes an
increase in life expectancy of 3 years and somewhat smaller immigration of 7 million people up
to the year 2040.
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It can be seen that the contribution rate remains almost constant up to about the year 2020,
increases rapidly after that, and by 2035 reaches its maximum value of between 28% to 31%
7.
Contribution rates of this order of magnitude will no longer be affordable and will lead to a revolt
by the young against the old. In the light of this development, one can only have misgivings
about the recent suggestion made by the Federal Ministry of Labor for lowering the retirement
age to 60. Realizing  this suggestion would raise the contribution rate by a further 3 to 4
percentage points and put an even greater strain on the labor market. Even without this, Germany
is at the start of an initially insidious, but increasingly alarming, crisis of the statutory pension
insurance system, one which can have serious consequences for the state itself if suitable counter
measures are not taken quickly.
4. Pay-as-You-Go vs. Funding: Basic Remarks
Germany could have looked at the coming demographic distortion quite composedly if its
pension insurance system had been a fully capital funded system and not a contributory pay-as-
you-go one, because the pensions could then have been financed by dispersing previous savings
instead of by using the contributions of the working generation. With capital funding, the
contributions to pension insurance are true savings which can be put on to the capital market and
used to finance real investments. The stream of payments which the real investments produce
can, if necessary, be used to pay back the loans to the savers and thus the pensions can be paid
without putting a burden on the contributors. The only problem then is to create the capital stock.
It is great if you have one, but the accumulation process is arduous.
After the pension insurance system had been established by Bismarck, it proved possible
to build up, in only ten years, a capital stock that could have financed the pensions for seventeen
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years. Unfortunately the world wars and the inflation thwarted the plan and destroyed the
system’s capital base. Today the pension insurance system lives from hand to mouth. Its fund is
only sufficient  to cover it for 11 days.
Most Germans have no idea that the pension insurance system is a pay-as-you-go one.
They think that the money that they pay into the pension insurance system today is in effect
savings that they will be able to use later. This belief is, of course, mistaken, as the contributions
are all used up in financing today’s pensioners. Nothing, but nothing, is being saved. The
supposed savings are just an illusion.
The illusion is encouraged by the equivalence between the contributions and the pensions,
which is the characteristic feature of the German pension system. The person who pays in twice
as much as his neighbor, later gets a pension which is about twice as large. One’s contributions
give a right to future pension payments and, to the contributor, this seems like paying into a
savings account. The Federal Constitutional Court even has included the earned right to pension
payments among the legal rights of ownership under Article 14 of the Basic Law.
In a pay-as-you-go system each generation when young pays its pension contributions to
the old generation and acquires the right to receive pensions when it is old. These pensions are
paid for by the next young generation’s contributions. The first generation pays nothing for its
pensions, each of the following generations must make payments to its preceding generation to
acquire the right to its own pensions. These rights are a hidden implicit government debt, which,
like an explicit government debt, must be paid for by the next generation. This implicit
government debt is created when the first generation comes into the pension insurance system
and it is turned over from generation to generation. Because the pensioners’ rights are linked to
wage developments, the size of the implicit government debt grows continuously over time, even
when the population size is constant.9
Today the cash value of the rights already acquired, that is, the implicit government debt,
is around DM 10 to 12 billion. That is more than Germany’s total fixed assets and a multiple of
the explicit government debt which comes to DM 2.2 billion. When the Euro came, the German
debt-GDP ratio was just above the Maastricht limit of 60%. If the implicit government debt of the
pension insurance is added in, the total debt-GDP ratio becomes about 350%.
The pay-as-you go system offers the contributors only a very modest return on the
contributions they have paid in. Those who only had a few years left to contribute when the
system was introduced in 1957 could pocket the initial profit and get a very high return to their
contributions, one which was much higher than the returns in the capital market. But anyone who
entered the scheme in 1957 or later made a worse deal than a capital market investment. Figure 3
shows the results of detailed calculations for this carried out at CES. The Figure shows the real
inflation adjusted returns that the different age cohorts of sample male pensioners, who entered
the pension insurance system after 1957, have received, or will receive in future, based on current
estimates. The cohort of the sample pensioners entered the pension insurance system at age 20.
Some drew a normal age pension after 45 years of contributing to the system, others drew an
early general disability pension, and still others died before they had received any pension. Some
of the age cohorts left widows and orphans who also drew a pension.10
Figure 3: The internal returns to the statutory pension insurance system (SPI)
Source: CES
It can be seen that the returns of the twenty year olds, who entered in 1957 and normally
will become pensioners in 2002, are still almost 3%. Those who entered as twenty year olds in
1990, however, can only expect a return on their contributions of 2%, and the young people who
enter now can only count on a real return of about 1.5%. By contrast, savings invested in ten year
federal bonds and rolled over for fifty years would, as the top curve shows, have brought a real
interest rate of about 4%.
It is not surprising that the returns to the pay-as-you -go system are so low. Theoretically,
these returns are explained by the real growth rate of total wages. The figure shows that the
theory comes pretty close to reality. The growth rate of total wages has, in fact, fallen greatly in
the last forty years. If, as a result of the demographic distortion, it falls further, the returns that the
pension insurance system can offer will also fall.11
At first sight, this data could be interpreted as a verdict on the German pension insurance
system. In this interpretation the system appears to be a completely inefficient way of arranging
old age provision; it should be abolished as quickly as possible and be replaced with a capital
coverage system. Many observers have indeed interpreted the difference in returns in this way,
and see it as a reason to introduce a capital coverage system.
This appearance deceives. To call the difference in returns "inefficient" is to make a
grossly mistaken economic interpretation. The truth is that the difference in returns is an essential
feature of the intergenerational redistribution. The difference in returns is an integral part of the
pay-as-you-go system which one can no longer escape from once this system has been set up. It
is the mirror image of the initial profit which accrued to the first post 1957 pension cohort; it has
already been distributed and cannot be taken back again. Each subsequent generation has
acquired a claim against the next generation by paying its pension contributions, but these claims
are never high enough to keep pace with a capital market investment. It is as if each generation is
paying an implicit tax to service the implicit government debt which resulted from the gift made
to the first generation. The pension insurance system is a zero sum game being played by present
and future generations in which the initial gain is mirrored by a loss of exactly the same amount
for each subsequent generation when the present value of this amount is correctly calculated on
an actuarial basis and when it is assumed that the discount rate and the interest rate at which
funds can be invested are the same.
8
Naturally, changing over to capital funding is attractive, if by doing so the implicit tax
hidden in the contributions can be avoided. But this is impossible because the pension claims
already established cannot simply be swept under the table. An explicit tax would be needed to
service these claims and in present value terms this would be as just high as the implicit tax12
which all successive generations would have to pay if the pay-as-you-go system were to continue.
Contrary to first appearances, it is not at all possible to exploit the returns advantage of the
funded system in a way that results in a net advantage for society. The claim that the funded
system is more efficient than the pay-as-you-go system because it brings higher returns is
completely false from an economic point of view, as the higher returns only show up if the tax
required to service past claims is disregarded.
5. Resolving the Crisis by Partial Capital Funding
All this does not mean that capital funding has no useful function. Quite the contrary, the
statutory pension insurance system is in urgent need of help from capital funding, but it needs it
for a different reason – not because it is inefficient. This reason is the demographic crisis that was
described in the introduction. The problem is not about finding a system which promises more
efficiency in the next century, it is about resolving the dangerous crisis which will affect the
present thirty to forty year olds when they reach pension age.
 If a generation is to survive in its old age without having to keep on working, it must
make provision for it and there are, in principle, two ways of doing this. Either it can save and
finance its keep by drawing on these savings, or it can have children so that these children will
take care of it later. In harsh economic terms – people who want to have comfortable old age
must have previously accumulated either real capital or „human capital“. Those who do not do
one or the other must starve, because you get nothing for nothing.
In the past decades Germans have chosen not to accumulate as much „human capital“ as
was usual in the past. This is the reason for the crisis. If they, nevertheless, still want to live
comfortably in their old age, their only option is to substitute real capital for the missing „human
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capital“. The additional real capital secures some of the present nominal pension claims, and it
prevents the subsequent generation having to carry an unjustified burden that is economically no
longer affordable. It should be possible to cope with the pension burden, which would otherwise
be crushing, by shouldering part of this burden now. This does not mean that changing over
completely to a capital funding system would be necessary. Real capital must only be built up by
the amount of the missing human capital. More than this is not required.
It is sometimes argued that the present employed generation cannot be expected to bear
the burden of accumulating capital as well as the burden of their pension contributions. The
transition to even partial capital accumulation, it is said, in itself implies an unfair double burden.
This position fails to recognize that the employed generation must always bear a double burden
since they must always maintain their own children as well as their parents. This was the case in
the pre-industrial family, it is the case in today’s world with government pension insurance, and it
can never be otherwise. The pensions problem has arisen because the current employed
generation has preferred to get rid of one of these burdens by having fewer children than was
usual in the past. It is in no way unfair to ask this generation to put the money they save from not
bringing up so many children into the capital market and to secure their pensions in this way. The
necessary ability to pay is certainly there and there is no unfair second burden.
Of course a problem does arise here when it is considered that some families have enough
children but other families have none. If those people, who are already financing the older
generation with their pension contributions and who are also maintaining a sufficient number of
children, are forced to save more, they will be faced with a third burden which can really be
called unfair. A partial dependence of the pension on the number of children could help solve this
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problem, but this a matter of justice between families rather than generations which is not
considered in this paper.
6. Results of Simulation Calculations
It is now time to be more specific. This section reports on the results of simulation calculations
carried out at CES to discover the quantitative effects of alternative suggestions for reforms
aimed at resolving the pensions crisis. The comparison refers to a complete transfer to capital
funding, undermining the contribution mountain by setting up a fund within the statutory pension
insurance system, and partial capital funding as in the alternative just discussed. The time path of
the pension claims set out in the 1997 Pension Reform Law is taken as given for all the
alternatives, so that only the developments of the burdens differ. Pensions for widows, orphans,
and the unemployable will, in any case, continue to be financed by way of pay-as-you-go
contributions. Capital funding will only be considered in relation to age pensions. The
calculations are based on the relatively optimistic population estimates made by the Federal
Statistical Office which were referred to in the beginning.
Figure 4 first shows the effects of an immediate transfer to full capital funding of age
pensions. All claims already established are respected and continue to be financed through pay-
as-you-go contributions. New claims, however, will be acquired entirely with capital
accumulation from real savings. The upper path shown in the figure gives the sum of the pay-as-
you-go contributions based on gross income and the savings contributions necessary to acquire
claims the same as those with pay-as-you-go financing. For comparison purposes, the
development of the contribution rate in the present pay-as-you-go system is again shown in the
lower path. It can be seen that the initial burden in the case of complete transfer to capital funding
is very high because the transition generation must pay twice – once for the other people’s
pensions which are based on already acquired claims and once for their own later pensions which15
are to be financed through savings. Only very gradually over the following decades does the pay-
as-you-go financing of the claims already built up become less important and the total burden
falls. Complete transfer will only occur around the year 2070.
Figure 4: Contributions versus full capital  funding
Source: CES
It can be seen that the transfer to full capital funding takes the system out of the frying pan
into the fire, because it is a mirror image of the pay-as-you-go path. The increase in charges to
over 28% of gross wages, which under the present circumstances is to be expected in the fourth
decade of the next century, starts immediately and so does the pensions crisis. Because the
transfer to capital funding makes no comparable long term increase in efficiency possible, one
can confidently reject this scenario.16
It would be ideal if there were a reform that would get rid of the impending crisis without
a new burden turning up somewhere else, but this kind of reform could only occur in Lotus Land.
In the real world, achieving an even distribution of the inevitable burden over time is expedient.
In this way a confidence crisis in the pension insurance system, which at the same time would be
a crisis of the state itself, could be averted.
One possibility to even out the burden over time is for the pension insurance system itself
to accumulate the capital that could be used in the crisis years to contribute to financing the
pensions. The pension contribution mountain would, so to speak, be undermined. Figure 5 shows
this undermining. It can be seen that permanent stabilization would be possible if the contribution
rate were to be raised immediately from the current 20% to 23.3% and kept at that level. In this
way, the pension insurance system could accumulate a capital stock in the years up to about 2025
and this capital stock would then gradually be drawn down because the contribution rate would
no longer be sufficient to finance the pensions. In this version, capital would only be accumulated
in a transition phase. In the long run the pension insurance system’s capital stock would once
again be zero.17
Figure 5: Pay-as-you-go versus undermining
Source: CES
Regardless of how attractive the undermining solution may appear at first sight, it fails to
take into account the covetousness with which the politicians would look at a capital stock
accumulated by the pension insurance system. It is hard to imagine a future federal Minister who
wants to win the next election, resisting the pensioners’ desire to use the capital stock
prematurely. Public money is a great temptation.
Evening out the distribution must be brought about in another way, without the pension
insurance system accumulating capital. One way which, after much discussion in the Scientific
Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Research at CES, has come to be
seen as practicable, is private partial capital funding with variable saving rates. Compulsory
savings of initially about 4 to 4.5% of gross wages is to be arranged immediately. The people18
insured, themselves, would deposit these savings with recognized investment institutions and
would inform the pension insurance system that they have done so. The compulsory savings will
be varied over time in a way that keeps the sum of the pension contributions and savings
contributions constant at about 24 to 24.5%. The investment institutions compete with one
another and their financial standing is strictly controlled by the regulatory authorities. The
regulatory authorities report on the average pension returns from capital which accrue in this way
to the relevant age groups. The pensions financed by contributions, and the contributions
themselves, will be reduced by the amount of these returns.
Figure 6: Contributions versus partial capital funding
Source: CES
The middle curve in Figure 6 shows the time path of the average contribution rates
required for the savings and pension contributions. The two other curves show the already19
familiar paths of the burdens of the pay-as-you-go system and the transfer to a fully funded
system. It can be seen that smoothing the path of the burden is in fact possible, and that the
burden is permanently lower in the crisis years after 2028 than with the present system. At the
peak of the crisis in 2035, the contribution rate is more than three percentage points lower than
the rate to be expected if the present pay-as-you-go method is retained. The burden is one
percentage point higher than with the collective undermining solution, but, unlike that solution, it
permanently accumulates capital. Up to the peak of the crisis, a quarter of the age pensions can be
financed from savings and, in the long run, half capital funding will be achieved. In the very long
term – in the last quarter of the next century – the burden will fall below that associated with the
undermining solution. The transfer to partial capital funding is then complete.
In the following Figure 7 it can be seen how the smoothing of the path of the burden
comes about through varying its components. The upper curve shows the total expenditures
whose path is already known from the previous figure. The curve below this shows as before the
necessary pay-as-you-go contributions. The curve begins with the present value of 20%, then
rises only very slowly because more and more capital funded pension components are available.
At the peak of the demographic crisis a contribution burden of only 22% will be reached, which
is much lower than the 28% which must be expected with the present system. The lower curve
shows the path of the compulsory savings rate which, together with the pay-as-you-go
contributions, makes up the total expenditures.
Up to about 2020 the compulsory savings rate is over 4%, it falls to only 1%  up to 2036
when it again rises gradually. This variability in the compulsory savings rate is what determines
the smoothing of the path of the total burden.20
Figure 7: The path of the savings rate
Source: CES
In the next twenty years the national income related savings in this solution are between 3
and 4 percent. This is not too much and not too little. Some critics of capital funding maintain
that the capital market cannot absorb more capital from savings and others maintain that savings
are irrelevant because national expenditure can only be financed from the national product of the
current period. This is not the place to explain why these statements are misleading, if not
completely wrong. But one thing is certain. Germany’s savings rate today of around 9% is well
below the 15%  which brought Germany prosperity and growth in the sixties. It could only be to
the economy’s benefit if the savings rate were to rise by 3 to 4 percentage points as a result of
capital funding the pension insurance. One would not have reached the savings rate of the sixties
but one would be getting closer to it. An increase in savings produces an increase in national21
product, and that increase in national product will make future national expenditure easier to
afford than it otherwise would have been.
6. Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that the German pension insurance system is sliding into a demographic crisis
and that partial capital funding on a private basis, but under government supervision, is a way to
avoid a disaster. Compared to this, Germany’s present policy of mere deficiency management is
no solution at all.
Germany’s crisis can be averted by capital funding without reducing the level of pensions
even further than the 1992 and 1997 reforms already have. Partial capital funding is the golden
mean between the extremes of pure pay-as-you-go financing and pure capital funding. It unites
the strengths of both the systems and, last but not least, is an insurance strategy with respect to
the idiosyncratic risks involved with both alternatives.
Bismarck wanted to prevent the old and the sick from being “pushed aside” by the young.
The reform presented in this paper will prevent the pension insurance system from one day being
pushed aside by the young and, with it, perhaps the state itself, too.22
Appendix: Comments on alternative contributions forecasts
The forecast shown in Figure 2 is a conditional estimate in which the conditions are assumptions
which do not have to be accepted. Other results follow from other assumptions. Figure 8 gives an
overview of alternative forecasts which have been made recently in different places. It can be
seen that the range of the forecasts of the contribution rate for the year 2030 is between about
25% and 31%. The third curve from below shows the lower of the forecasts made at the Center
for Economic Studies (CES), which have also been used by the Scientific Advisory Council of the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Research and on which this paper is based.
Figure 8: Alternative forecasts of the development of the contributions rate
Sources: Sozialbeirat (1998); Prognos (1998); Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
(1998); Schnabel (1998); Langmantel (1997); Besendorfer, Borgmann and Raffelhüschen (BBR, 1998).23
A look at the other forecasts permits to see how sensitive the calculations are to
alternative assumptions. It is noteworthy how low the estimates of the contribution rates made by
Prognos-AG for the Federal Ministry of Labor and the Federal Association of Pension Insurance
Institutions are 
9. One third of the difference between this and the CES forecast (1.25 percentage
points) stems from the fact that the Prognos-AG assumes increases in the federal grant over and
above that determined in 1997, and two thirds (2.45 percentage points) from the fact that it
assumes a large increase in other, differently based, rates of taxes and charges on wage incomes.
The higher the other charges, the lower the pension claims implied by the German pension
formula, and the lower the resulting contributions burden. Prognos implicitly assumes that the
total burden on wage incomes from income tax and charges for pension, health, unemployment,
and nursing insurance will be an alarming 70%, while the CES forecast implicitly assumes a total
burden of 66%. Here, the tax needed to finance the increased federal grants, which Prognos really
must impute, is not even included. Reduced to a single denominator, the pension burden indicated
by Prognos is relatively low because both the other burdens and the total burden on employees
are assumed to be relatively high. Looking at the Prognos calculations as a whole, the arguments
in favor of partial capital funding are considerably stronger than with the CES forecast. While
politicians have read an all clear signal for the pension problem from the Prognos forecast, this
indicates that the calculations published by Prognos have been grossly misinterpreted.
The CES forecast is a status quo prediction. It assumes a constant rate for charges for
other purposes, because it wants to isolate the effect of the demographic distortion on the pension
contributions. There will be several more tax reforms and changes in the pattern of other charges
by the time the peak of the crisis arrives. One of these is the tax reform already decided on by the
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new Federal Government which Prognos has not taken into account. In view of this political
uncertainty, it makes little sense to carry out the calculations on the basis of the current income
tax progression scale. The pension reduction that will be produced through this mechanism as a
result of adjustment of net wages is an artifact which will  certainly not reflect the reality of the
next four decades.
 The CES  forecast used in this paper is the more cautious of the two alternative forecasts
because it assumes a large immigration (11 million) and no further increase in life expectancy in
West Germany. Only the East German life expectancy is assumed to increase until it reaches the
West German level. If it is assumed, as the Interministerial Working Group does (cf. figure 2),
that there will be a further increase in life expectancy of three years and a smaller immigration (7
million) then the CES  forecast, too, largely coincides with the top three forecasts shown in the
figure.25
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